Participation in the UEFA Club competitions is achieved through sporting success. And thanks to the unpredictability of football competitions, this success is not taken for granted, nor is it expected by all clubs. Many clubs have enjoyed unexpected successes through national leagues or cups late in the season, granting them the right to participate in European competitions for the next football season.
Crystal Palace’s 2024/25 FA Cup triumph is one of those cases. Nevertheless, they were not prepared to reap the benefits of this success (through the qualification for the UEFA Europa League), standing as a prime example for MCO businesses, who were reminded that it is always better to be safe than sorry.
In CAS 2025/A/11604 Crystal Palace Football Club v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), Nottingham Forest Football Club & Olympique Lyonnais, CAS analyses certain prohibitions established by UEFA in connection with multi-club ownership, and the time limits for complying with the relevant criteria set by UEFA.
In particular, the Panel examined:
- The existence of a violation of art. 5.01(b), under which a person may not be simultaneously involved, either directly or indirectly, in any capacity whatsoever in the management, administration and/or sporting performance of more than one club participating in a UEFA Club Competition,
- The existence of a violation of art. 5.01(c), under which an individual or legal entity is prohibited from having control or influence over more than one club participating in a UEFA Club Competition. Control or influence is defined as
(i) holding a majority of the shareholders’ voting rights
(ii) having the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of the club;
(iii) being a shareholder and alone controlling a majority of the shareholders’ voting rights pursuant to an agreement entered into with other shareholders of the club; or
(iv) being able to exercise by any means a decisive influence in the decision-making of the club.
The definition of the term “involvement” – the prohibition of art. 5.01(b).
The Panel stated that an “involvement” under art. 5.01(b) is not subject to any conditions. The word “to be involved” shall be understood as the mere act of being part of something. The prohibited involvement may be “direct or indirect”, while the person may be involved “in any capacity whatsoever”.
The Court also underlined that this is supported by the systematic interpretation of the relevant MCO provisions. The Court noted that, If the actual involvement of the person in question was required, then art. 5.01(b) would overlap with art. 5.01(c), which requires the ability to exercise decisive influence in the decision-making of the club.
Finally, the Court addressed the difficulty of proving the actual involvement of a person in the decision-making of a club, if art. 5.01(b) required the actual involvement of a person instead of the “mere involvement”.
All in all, in the case at hand, the Court determined that a person holding the position of director and principal partner in the companies which constitute the governing bodies of a club, enjoying voting rights allowing them to participate in crucial decisions of the club, suffice to constitute involvement in the sense of article 5.01(b) of the UEFA Europa League Regulations.
The definition of “decisive influence” – the prohibition under article 5.01(c).
The Panel invoked the definition of the term “decisive influence”, as provided by UEFA in the Circular of 14.05.2024, referring to all four indicators enumerated in the Circular, and applying each one of them in the present case.
In this sense, the Panel found:
(a) that the person in question held a majority of the shareholders’ voting rights, since they held more than 30% of the club’s total shares, thereby triggering the first indicator of decisive influence,
(b) that the person in question provided substantial financial support to the club from August 2021 until January 2024 (49% of the paid-in capital of the governing body of the club),
(c) that the mere ability to exercise decisive influence (and not whether influence is actually exercised) is sufficient to trigger the prohibition of art. 5.01(c)(iv), and underlined that the person in question fell within the scope of this prohibition, because he was holding executive positions of governing bodies of the club,
(d) that the person in question had the ability to influence (or actually influenced) in a decisive manner the transfers of the club.
The deadline for compliance with the art. 5.01(b) and 5.01(c).
Amongst others, the club argued that UEFA had the discretion to permit clubs to cure their non-compliance with the MCO rules after the assessment date (i.e. after 1st of March 2025).
The Panel emphasised that the establishment of blind trusts as a means to comply with the MCO rules after the assessment date was a temporary solution for the UEFA 2024/25 season, as explicitly stated in the Circular of 14.05.2024.
The Panel also referred to a Letter sent by the ECA to its members on 25.10.2024, which stated that based on the discretion granted to UEFA in article 4.07 of the UCC Regulations, UEFA would not refer any cases to the UEFA CFCB in the event clubs would have become compliant with the MCO rules between the 1st of March and that moment in time when they would qualify for the European club competitions. The Panel underlined that this was not an email sent by UEFA and only expressed the subjective interpretation of ECA, having no binding effect vis-à-vis UEFA.
In conclusion, the sale of shares by the person in question, after the 1st of March 2025, did not cure the breach of articles 5.01(b) and 5.01(c).
Taking into consideration the above, the Court confirmed UEFA CFCB’s decision and decided that Crystal Palace is prohibited from participating in the UEFA Europa League and shall take part in the UEFA Conference League.